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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

IS THERE A PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE
LAW OF BAILMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
In discussing this problm we will assume that there is a bailment, that there
has been a demand for the return of the article, and that there has been a failure
to return it, or it has been returned in a damaged condition.
When the bailor proves the above, does a presumption of negligence
arise? The authorities support the finding thai there is a presumption of negligence
but that thee is
in the mutual benefit type of bailment or bailment for hire,'
2
no such presumption in the case of a gratuitious bailment.
Let us first consider the mutual benefit bailment. In order for the bailor
to recover from the bailee, he must prove a lack of ordinary care. 3 To prove
this is often quite difficult because all the information is in the hands of the
bailee who has exclusive possession.' It is for this reason that a presumption is
desirable.
It is more difficult to discover the methods by which this presumption is
rebutted. In order to discuss this it will be necessary to break the cases into three
classes:
1. Loss or damage caused by fire.
2. Loss or damage caused by theft.
3. Loss or damage caused by means other than specific casualty.
In our first situation where the bailed article is destroyed or damaged by fire,
it is said that if destruction by a general fire is shown by clear and satisfactory
evidence, this will be sufficient to rebutt the presumption. 6 It is not necessary to
show that he exercised proper care over the article, but only that the goods were
destroyed by the fire.6 Merely accounting for the loss in a way not to implicate
himself in a charge of negligence is a sufficient defense, unless the plaintiff
proves negligence.7 It naturally follows, that if the bailor shows the fire in his
pleadings, no presumption will arise since he has proved the bailee's case for
him. It would then be up to the bailor to prove negligence.
In Schell v. Miller Storage Co.8 the court says in substance that when the
bailor shows a bailment, demand and failure to deliver, the bailee has the duty
1
2

8
4
5

Safe Deposit Co. v. Pollock, 85 Pa. 391, 27 Am. Rep. 660 (1878): Logan v. Mathews, 6 Pa.
417 (1847); Schell v. Miller Storage Co., 142 Super 293, 16 A.2d 680 (1940).
First National Bank v. Rex, 89 Pa. 308. 33 Am. Rep. 767 (1879): Hibenia Building Ai.
sociaton v. McGrath, 154 Pa. 296, 26 A. 377 (1893).
Tower v. Grocer's Supply and Storage Co., 159 Pa. 106, 28 A. 229 (1893).
See note I Schell case: Beckman v. Shouse, 5 Rawle 179, 28 Am. Dec. 653 (1835).
Yeo v. Miller North Broad Storage Co., 146 Super. 408, 23 A.2d 79 (1941).

6 See note 5.

7 National Line Steamship Co. v. Smart, 107 Pa, 492 (1884).
8 See note 1 Schell case.
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of going forward with the evidence accounting for the loss, and if the bailee
fails so to do, he is responsible for the loss, it being assumed that the bailee has
failed to exercise the ordinary care required. The bailee need not show he used
due care, but merely show by clear and satisfactory proof that the goods were lost
and the manner. When he has done this and his proofs do not disclose lack of
due care on his part, then the bailor must prove the bailee's negligence. This
case is the leading case and is cited by all the later cases.
In the same case it is said that the rules are similar in our second classification,
loss caused by theft, although the burdens on the bailee may differ in each case.
They say the thing required is to give the bailor a sufficient explanation to
enable him to conduct an investigation of his own. It has been held to be error
to charge that the bailee has the burden of proving that the loss was not due to
his negligence.9 There appear to be several cases in conflict with this statement;' 0
however in reality they are not in disagreement. The courts say that if a bailee
fails to return the bailed property or give a satisfactory explanation for its disappearance, the bailee has the burden of proving that the loss was not due to his
negligence. This is on the theory that the bailee has the best means of ascertaining the facts and must excuse or justify the failure to return. Thus we see that
in reality this gives the bailee another method of rebutting the presumption,
that of showing he used due care in all operations. It would be used only where
the bailee could not give a sufficient accounting and apparently is used in theft
cases in the main."

In our third situation, loss or damage caused by means other than specific
casualty, the rule is that a general accounting may suffice if it offers an explanation
of what occurred. Thus it appears to depend on the circumstances of each case.
12
A good statement of the rule is found in O'Malley v. Penn-Athletic Club,
where a coat was lost from a checkroom. In substance it was stated, where the
property is delivered to a bailee in good condition and it is not returned, the law
presumes negligence to be the cause, the burden of going forward is on the bailee
to show loss is due to other causes consistent with due care on his part.
The cases have in many instances used the word inference. The question
arises, is this a correct usage?
The courts have used the term in situations in which the presumption has
been rebutted. In such a case the court says the jury may infer from the evidence
placed before them by the bailor and the bailee that there was lack of ordinary
care. 18 This use of the word has no effect on the presumption since it is already
9 Carlton v. Sley System Garages, 143 Super. 127, 17 A.2d 748 (1940).
10 Wendt v. Sley System Garage, 124 Super. 224, 188 A. 624 (1936).

11 See note 10.

12 119 Super. 584, 181 A. 370 (1935); See note 1 Logan case.
13 See note 1 ScheIl case at 298; Widowski v. Lupowitz, 164 Super. 298, 63 A.2d 106 (1949);
See note 4 Beckman case.
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rebutted. This appears to be a method used by the court to submit the case on
its facts to the jury. However there is one case which seems to use the word,
inference incorrectly. This is Woodraff v. Painter1 where the bailor at the
suggestion of a clothing store clerk put his watch in a drawer while having a
fitting. The bailor proved non-delivery of the watch and won the case. The court
uses inference in the charge, but also says that the bailee must prove loss,
theft or fire to explain the non-delivery. The correct result was gained but the
wrong word was used. Also, the courts have said that the presumption does not
disappear upon the introduction of evidence.26
We must also note that the proof offered by the bailee must be by clear
and satisfactory evidence in order to rebutt the presumption. Clear and satisfactory evidence is that degree of proof between a preponderance of evidene
and beyond a reasonable doubt.16 It appears from the language of the courts
that this is the type of presumption which requires dear and satisfactory proof
to rebutt. However, the exhaustive article on presumptions in Pennsylvania which
I have cited fails to mention our bailment situation. Nevertheless the court's
language seems dear.
We have stated in the beginning of the article that there appears to be no
presumption in a gratuitious bailment, for the sole benefit of the bailor. There
are no cases to be found in which a presumption was relied upon. It is said, however, that such a bailee is liable only for that loss caused by fraud or for such
gross negligence that amounts to fraud, and that the burden of proof is on the
bailor.27 This means little however since the rule is the same in the mutual benefit
bailments except as to the degree of care. But from the general attitude of the
courts, it would seem that the best rule is to require the bailor to prove negligence
affirmatively without the aid of the presumption.
When the bailment is for the sole benefit of the bailee only slight negligence
is required to enable the bailor to recover. In such a case it seems evident that
the bailor may rely on the presumption since in the mutual benefit bailment
the bailor is entitled to a presumption of a lack of ordinary care, a degree higher
than slight negligence.
We conclude that there is a presumption of negligence in the mutual
benefit bailment, and a bailment for the sole benefit of the bailee, that there
is no such presumption in the case of a bailment for the sole benefit of the bailor,
and that it is up to the bailee to rebutt this presumption where it arises.
This may be done in the following ways depending upon the situation:
1. By giving general proof of fire and showing the goods were destroyed
by it.
14 150 Pa. 91, 24 A. 621 (1892).

15 See note 5 Yeo case; See note 16.
16 Pa. Bar Ass. Q. Oct. 1945 p. 89 and also Jun. 1946, P. 193.
17 See note 2 for both cases.
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2. By giving a sufficient accounting or explanation of the theft to enable
the bailor to conduct his own investigation of the matter. Whether the
bailee has succeeded depends upon the circumstances.
3. By the bailee showing that the failure to return is due to some cause consistent with due care on his part.
4. By showing that he has exercised due care in all respects, if the bailee
is unable to rebutt the presumption in any other way.
John A. Roe

